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C haucer s retracciouns” are to  be found throughout his work where he 
ironically presents a  m eaning from  which he pulls back, w ithdraw s, or re­
trac ts . In the difference between the m eaning retracted  from  and th e  right 
m eaning “retracted  to ,” the  reader’s response is exercised in an eth ical test. 
C haucer’s good “enten te” engages the  reader in the  rhetoric of “retraccioun” 
as it applies th roughou t his work and not ju s t in w hat has been called his 
“R etraction” a t the end of “T he P arson’s Tale.” 1
W hen C haucer the scrip tor writes of his conversation w ith  the  Monk, 
for exam ple, “And I seyde his opinion was good,” C haucer’s in ten tion  in its 
ethical context is to  pull the reader back, to  re trac t, from a  s tra ig h t reading 
th a t the M onk’s opinion is in fact good. T his is one of m any of C haucer’s 
“retracciouns,” as he refers to  them  in the plural a t the end of The Canter­
bury Tales in the  Epilogue to  “T he  P arson’s Tale.” In fact, the  m eaning we 
are fam iliar w ith in the so-called “R etraction,” th a t C haucer wished to  re­
tra c t or annul the works them selves, is itself a m eaning from which C haucer 
in tended us to  re trac t. I t  is there in the tex t ju s t as the m eaning th a t the 
Monk s opinion is good is in the text, and Chaucer intended it to  be there: 
it would protect him  from  vicious censors. B ut he also in tended a  more 
subtle and m oral m eaning for the “R etraction,” which m odern readers by 
and large have missed. A right reading of the “R etraction” involves obsolete
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m eanings of four key words in Chaucer’s text: intent, revoke, retract, and 
guilt, words so fam iliar we do not suspect them  of any alien m eaning. Ex­
pressed in th is vocabulary, furtherm ore, are concepts usually  m issing in the 
presum ptions of m odern understanding. F irst, the reader’s response m ust 
be considered an  ethical response. As the Gawain postscrip t says: “Hony 
soyt qui m al pense.” In th a t we are all to  tell our story  in redeemed history, 
we are to  becom e story  tellers like the pilgrim s and to  practise, as David 
W illiam s pu ts  it, bo th  good “audienceship and au thorsh ip” (100). T he in- 
ten tionality  of a  tex t is a com m unal project of bo th  au tho r and reader. As 
we m ight expect of a culture of the book, Lee P atterson  poin ts out,
medieval misprison brought with it little but anxiety. Far from freeing read­
ers from the burden of the past, it delivered them  into the hands of the 
enemy: witness the two most famous of all medieval misreaders, Paolo and 
Francesca. . . . And they are significantly compared to  other exemplary read­
ers, Augustine reading the Scriptures in his garden and Abelard and Heloise 
reading the auctores together. (141)
In his oeuvre, C haucer frequently expresses his concern for the reader’s 
in ten t; and in the  “R etraction ,” C haucer’s s ta tem en t of his own in ten t im ­
plies the  in ten tionality  of the  tex t and the reader’s own learning in the 
in ten t of “oure doctrine.” Unless the reader’s response is understood in its 
eth ical m om ent, it  is difficult to figure ou t why C haucer could be asking 
for forgiveness of his “giltes,” nam ely for “translacions and  enditynges” ju s t 
after saying “ ‘Al th a t is writen is writen for oure doctrine ,’ and th a t is 
m yn en ten te .” I t  m ust be clear th a t there is no book a  sa in t cannot read, 
nor any tex t a sinner cannot corrupt. Some reader response m ay indeed be 
wicked; and a  reader can sin. B ut can good au thoria l in ten tion  have any 
guilt for such sin? T his question involves a  second idea, also foreign to  our 
m inds — th a t the  notion  of guilt allows for involuntary sin, th a t one can be 
guilty  th rough defaute for w hat happens by accident as in m anslaughter; 
for the wickedness of others, such as m inors in one’s care; for w hat one 
fails to  realize in sins of omission, as in the unconscious heritage of racism , 
sexism, original sin, and so forth , or the thoughtless personal failures of 
self-righteousness and pride.
In order to  understand  the tex t of C haucer’s “R etrac tion” as he m eant 
it, we m ust be prepared to  understand th a t he could feel guilt for how 
readers had failed to  get the m oral point of some of his irony and had fallen 
in to  vicious in te rp re ta tion  and been wicked in, for exam ple, condoning the 
behaviour of the M onk. T he m oral tests Chaucer set m ight have been too 
hard . T he failure of various different readers, which C haucer could have
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observed in his lifetim e, would be an ethical failure in the jo in t in tentionality  
of reader and au thor. E thical failure is sin, the very failure C haucer prays 
“th a t C rist for his grete mercy foryeve me the synne.”
One further proclivity of m ediaeval in terpreta tion  needs to be rein­
forced, perhaps, if we are to  get w hat Chaucer is saying: the view from a 
tem poral aevum ensures the force of the simple present tense of “revoke” : 
“to call back a vice from  people.” Chaucer revokes vanity in the tex ts  he 
m entions now and also when they are w ritten.
Such a sum m ary in troduction  to  the world version of C haucer’s tex t has 
to be elaborated  in detailed verbal analysis. B ut perhaps it m ay already 
m ake possible a glimpse of w hat Chaucer m eans in w hat he writes. W ithou t 
such a glimpse, no am ount of analysis can make sense of a picture th a t if 
you do not get it is not there. So even though I have not yet m ade m y case, 
I plead w ith m y reader to  try  and see it “m y” way, a t least ju s t once. Take 
care to  read the antecedent of “the  whiche” as “worldly vanitees.” C haucer 
writes:
For oure book seith, “A1 th a t is writen is writen for oure doctrine,” and th a t 
is myn entente. /  Wherfore I biseke yow mekely, for the mercy of God, th a t 
ye preye for me th a t Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes; /  and 
namely of my translacions and enditynges of worldly vanitees, the whiche I 
revoke in my retracciouns: /  as is the book of Troilus; the book also of Fame; 
the book of the xxv. Ladies; [etc.], (1083-86)
If C haucer had wished to  em phasize the m eaning th a t the books them ­
selves should be annulled, he would have left out the “as is” and ju s t listed 
the books, “the book of Troilus, etc.” If he had wished to  em phasize his 
intended m eaning, ra ther th an  hide it a little  b it, he could have said  “as 
in” ra th er than  “as is” ; b u t he m ain tains bo th  m eanings by saying “as is” 
followed by a list of books, which as books, however, m ust be in apposition 
not to  “vanitees” b u t to  “translacions and enditynges.”
As a C hristian  poet who has ju s t  been preaching in the voice of the  P ar­
son, C haucer has the welfare of his readers on his m ind and is speaking of his 
responsibility for them  in the serious ethical m om ent of reading when they 
do not get his irony. T h a t th is is w hat Chaucer is saying in the “R etrac tion” 
cannot be proved or disproved by looking to  his oeuvre to  see if he has ac­
tually  done w hat he said. T his would require a search under every trope and 
phrase for a bad intention  —  clearly impossible w ithout begging the initial 
question of in ten tion  in the “R etraction .” Irony operates w ithin an ethical 
context a t particu lar points, so th a t w hat one is to  re trac t and pull back 
from is not determ ined by the m ere possibility of irony. C haucerian irony is
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governed by C haucer’s ethics. Given ethics tw isted enough, even the “Re­
trac tio n ” itself could be sarcastic irony, although its coherence would m ake 
it a m ost b itte r opposite of w hat is said. Our shared in tu ition  of C haucer’s 
rhetorical stra tegy  does, however, support a non-sarcastic reading of his fi­
nal supplication. We are fam iliar w ith the good hum oured com passion of 
Chaucerian irony th a t encourages readers to  exercise their own m oral fac­
ulties in judging  characters and in debating the m oral principles through 
which a narra tive  is constitu ted . T h a t this in tu ition  is the  basis for a co­
herent reading of w hat C haucer says in the “R etraction” m ay be discovered 
in a detailed explication of the “R etraction” itself.
T he P arson ends his ta le  or “tre tys” in the dialectics of heavenly ac­
cess: in th is fallen world, we m ay purchase the blissful reign “by poverte 
espiritueel, and the glorie by lowenesse, the plentee of joye by hunger and 
th u rs t, and the reste by travaille, and the lyf by deeth and m ortificacion of 
synne” (1080), and as C haucer m ight add, right in terp re ta tions by perennial 
“retracciouns” of wrong ones. After preaching holy doctrine in the  voice of 
the Parson, the  voice of the poet merges in to  th a t voice in a request for 
thanksgiving to  C hrist for any wisdom in the “tre ty s ,” for C hrist is the 
source of all wisdom:
Now preye I to hem alle that herkne this litel tretys or rede, that if ther be
any thyng in it that liketh hem, that therof they thanken oure Lord Jhesu
Crist, of whom procedeth al wit and al goodnesse. (1081)
T he debate over the extension of the word “tre ty s” here hangs on 
w hether there is a precise po in t dividing the P arson’s voice from  the n a rra ­
to r ’s and  then  from  C haucer’s. Even w ithout the rubric “Heere taketh  the 
m akere of th is book his leve,” usually added before th is line 1081, identifica­
tion  of the “I” in th is line as the  Parson soon merges w ith the identification 
of subsequent “I ’s” as the n a rra to r and then Chaucer himself. And, con­
versely, even w ith the rubric, the “I” (1081) cannot be dissociated from  the 
voice of the n a rra to r as the  Parson because of the possible reference of “th is 
litel tre ty s” to  the  P arso n ’s own tale. There is no precise dividing point: the 
voices blend in to  each other. And the word “tre tys” then  extends not only 
to  the treatise  of the Parson ju s t  com pleted bu t also to  the com plete Can­
terbury Tales, while th is extension anticipates the subject o f o ther works 
of C haucer himself. T his blending of voices and m erging and em erging of 
identities m ust, however, be refracted into world versions like our own: we 
are not to  im agine a three-headed m onster w ith three m ouths one each for 
the Parson, the n a rra to r, and  Chaucer, all speaking a t once. T he iden tity  of 
the speaking “I” m ust change somewhere from the Parson to  Chaucer, the
au th o r o f the book of Troilus, etc. This retrospective identification works 
backw ard on the tex t to  “Now preye I to  hem alle th a t herkne this litel tre tys 
or rede” ; so the “tre ty s” becomes C haucer’s in the voice of the Parson. This 
retrospective identification works against taking any p a rt of the “R etrac­
tio n ,” such as lines 1085—1090a (up to  “soule” ), as C haucer’s in terrup tion  
in to  w hat is otherwise only the P arson ’s voice. Nor is there any point at 
which it is clear C haucer’s voice stops and the P arson ’s resumes: gram ­
m atical parallel links the syntax; the  final request th a t the “I” be “saved” 
is ju s t  w hat Chaucer him self has been concerned about. The final Latin 
prayer then  harks back to  the P arson’s voice as a  typical conclusion to  a 
serm on, bu t as a prayer spoken for us all it does not exclude C haucer’s voice 
either, nor the angels’ in the m ystical choir of heavenly carnival. The point 
o f the “R etrac tion” read all in C haucer’s voice, including the Latin  close, is 
sim ilar in m any ways to  the th ru st of of Douglas W urtele’s argum ent th a t 
lines 1085-1090a are in fact an in terpolation . Indeed, the present paper 
orig inated  in m y own m is-reading of a  page in the offprint of his article on 
“T he Penitence of Geoffrey Chaucer” : “The p o e t’s trouble is not th a t the 
offending portions of his work m ay be m isinterpreted bu t th a t, read literally, 
they will cause scandal or lead his readers in to  tem pta tion . For th is offence 
he publicly voices regret” (W urtele 336). A wrong literal in terpreta tion  is a 
m isin terpretation . And as I had learned in the ethical herm eneutics of the 
Gawain m anuscrip t, “Hony soyt qui mal pense.” Hence I thought the ar­
gum ent m ight be th a t Chaucer is saying he never had intended his work to  
have a literal m eaning th a t would cause the scandal o f a  stum bling block in 
the way of a fellow viator. T his was certainly not w hat I had understood by 
the “R etrac tion ,” which, lo, on tu rn ing  to  it, I found can indeed be reread 
th is way I am  now arguing for here. So through m y m isprison of W urtele’s 
argum ent, his work on the “R etraction” discovers, if I am  righ t, a deeper 
m eaning. He and I agree on the large question o f C haucer’s rhetoric, th a t 
“it was a dangerous experim ent in the  a rt o f teaching w ith delight,” bu t not 
th a t Chaucer “finally had to  exam ine his work not as artistic  products but 
as m oral acts” (356) — as if he had not always considered them  m oral acts.
Chaucer in the present reading, accordingly, is to  be taken throughout 
the “R etraction” as speaking in his own voice. After paying a  com plim ent 
to  his readers by im plying they are the sort to  be pleased in such a  way th a t 
they can thank  C hrist for it, and also im plying th a t  th is is the definition of 
his proper reader, Chaucer then gives the credit for such things “th a t liketh 
hem  to  C hrist “of whom procedeth al wit and al goodnesse.” Here we have 
taken  Chaucer only to  be plying his courtly trade in theology: “D on’t thank
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me, thank  C hrist. W hat you like in w hat I write is due to the  source of 
m y w it and ‘al goodnesse’ in C hrist.” B ut he is also subtly  saying “D on’t 
thank  me for m y wit, thank  C hrist for your own w it.” T he constitu tion  
o f w hat pleases readers in all goodness depends on the source of their own 
righ t judgem ent and wit in C hrist. The reader’s as well as the w riter’s w it is 
im plicated in the tex t, and good readers m ay thank  C hrist for w hat “liketh 
hem .”
In the sam e com plim entary way, these good readers are presum ed to 
detect error in w hat displeases them  (for which they could also thank  C hrist
—  for the w it to  be displeased w ith error). B ut C haucer pleads his errors 
are ignorant not wilful, a result of his “unkonnynge,” lack of poetical ta len t 
a n d /o r  doctrinal understanding.
And if ther be any thyng th a t displese hem, I preye hem also th a t they arrette  
it to  the defaute of myn unkonnynge, and nat to my wyl, th a t wolde ful fayn 
have seyd be ttre  if I hadde had konnynge. (1082)
So the displeasure of C haucer’s good readers cannot be for evil doctrine 
in tended by C haucer — a t least not as he him self is able to  see his in tentions 
a t th is po in t of final supplication to  the reader —  which so far, accordingly, 
neither is nor an tic ipates a  “R etraction .” “If there are m istaken poetics or 
errors in the  doctrine of th is ‘tre ty s ,’ blam e m y ignorance,” Chaucer says, 
“I d id n ’t  do it on purpose.” A nd his voice shifts further from  the P arson ’s 
to  his own.
T hen C haucer takes a  few jum p s in the argum ent: if the reader is 
supposed to  sort ou t good and bad doctrine in reading “T he P arson ’s Tale” 
and certainly to  do the sam e in the o ther tales, the  reader is supposed to 
do so not sim ply to  excuse the au thor on the  grounds of ignorance b u t also 
for the  reader’s own good and “doctrine.” And this applies not only to 
m istaken doctrine the au thor left through ignorance b u t also to the  false 
doctrine left th rough irony in the  p o e t’s a rt —  the im plied “R etraction” of 
any vicious teaching in all his secular work: “For oure book seith, ‘Al th a t 
is w riten is w riten for oure doctrine ,’ and th a t is m yn entente” (1083).
Since the P arson ’s non-ironic voice still lingers in these lines, “Al th a t is 
w riten” includes his own holy “tre tys” and its doctrine; b u t C haucer’s voice 
is also heard in these lines as the w riter, so “Al th a t is w riten” includes 
indeed all th a t is w ritten , including C haucer’s Canterbury Tales. I t  is here 
w ith  regard to the way all th a t is w ritten  is for our doctrine th a t Chaucer 
declares his “en ten te” :2 the constitu tion  of any narrative m ust be a  righteous 
learning activ ity  of judgm en t and construal. There is no book a sa in t cannot 
read. G od does no t skip over the  parts  of history He does not like. Nor is
fiction as p a rt of w hat we actually  hear and tell excluded from th a t history 
as it includes our fictions. Good readers, likewise, m ust try  to  read ethically 
“al th a t is w riten .” Chaucer, moreover, does not say th a t was his in ten t 
and perhaps no longer is. He says “th a t is myn enten te” : “th a t  is m y in ten t 
in The Canterbury Tales, and, therefore, was when I wrote them , ju s t as it 
still is in The Canterbury Tales” — tales for which, accordingly, he could 
hardly  be m aking a “R etraction .”
T he N un’s Priest, w ith whose ironic cast Chaucer him self is often iden­
tified, m akes a sim ilar connection between his own tex t and Saint P a u l’s 
tex t (il T im o thy  3:16):
But ye th a t holden this tale a folye,
As of a fox, or of a cok and hen,
T aketh the moralité, goode men.
For seint Paul seith th a t al th a t writen is,
To oure doctrine it is ywrite, ywis;
T aketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille.
Now, goode God, if th a t it be thy  wille,
As seith my lord, so make us alle goode men,
And brynge us to  his heighe blisse! Amen. (3438-46)
T he N un’s Priest includes his own tale in “al th a t w riten is” ju s t as a t 
the “R etrac tion” Chaucer includes his oeuvre, referring to  the sam e tex t of 
Saint Paul. It is not only a t the  end of his career, accordingly, when his 
“R etrac tion” is presum ed to  have been w ritten, th a t Chaucer was fam iliar 
w ith the in ten tion  th a t narrative be w ritten (and read) for our doctrine 
and  learning. And as a C hristian , he would not repudiate th is in ten tion  of 
the  N un’s P riest as his own. Chaucer had the sam e in tention , therefore, 
in w riting  “T he N un’s P rie s t’s Tale” and probably in all The Canterbury 
Tales as he does in the “R etraction ,” so The Canterbury Tales them selves 
could not be w hat is re tracted  in the “R etraction .” T he critical m om ent of 
“retraccioun” is also considered, probably facetiously, by the N un’s Priest 
in the herm eneutics offered to  those who hold his ta le  a  “folye/ As of a fox 
or of a  cok and hen” : “Taketh  the m oralité, goode m en. . . . T aketh  the 
fruyt, and la t the chaf be stille.”
T he debate w hether history is mere shadow or actual prom ise prevents 
the narra tive  account of w hat happened from  being m ere unproblem atic 
chaff (P reus 111). In a Judaeo-C hristian  context, where history  is im por­
ta n t, one cannot say “forget the story of Jesus on the Cross, and ju s t  take 
the m orality” or “forget the story of Moses and Exodus, and ju s t  take the 
m orality” : there is no m orality  w ithout w hat happened ju s t as w ithout 
m orality  w hat happened is not even a “w hat.” Ethics is intrinsic to  our
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constitu tion  of events. Taking the N un’s P rie st’s story as chaff is not such 
an egregious dismissal of the literal level, b u t sim ilar considerations apply. 
Even though the story is about a  talking fox and cock and hen, indeterm ina- 
cies of the  tex t still m ust be filled in w ith reference to  a m inim al departure 
from  our actual world: the values exemplified by the case h istory do not exist 
ap a rt from  actual history. One can kick the ladder away as one climbs into 
P laton ic  heaven, b u t not to C hristian  heaven, which is, as the redem ption 
of history, the ladder itself. Those who do not take the ta le  of Chauntecleer 
as itself “folye” m ay take the fru it and chaff as one, and bo th  comically 
as p a rt of the “corn.” T he N un’s priest as the au tho r of the Tale is not 
likely to  be am ong those who consider it a “folye” ; otherwise, he would not 
have to ld  it. A esthetically, he would not consider the figurative language of 
the ta le  reducible to  a  sim ple m oral or political message. A nd ethically, to 
po in t ou t the  absurd ity  of taking it  as “folye,” he cites S ain t P a u l’s le tter to 
T im othy, which w ith specific reference to  sacred scrip ture could never have 
been used to  argue th a t T im othy  should ju s t take the “m oralité” and forget 
the scriptures, although the comedy of including bo th  fru it and chaff, the 
whole corn of the ta le  of cock and hen, w ith scripture in  “all th a t w ritten  
is,” w ould no t be lost on the  N un’s Priest. B ut it is a joyous comedy: our 
doctrine in scrip ture m ust be the sam e doctrine in th e  tex t of “all th a t 
w ritten  is.”
N either would C haucer the au thor be likely to  consider his whole life’s 
oeuvre a  “folye,” chaff to  be blown away, as if it never happened. T h a t is 
no t the kind of “retraccioun” either the N un’s P riest or C haucer is likely to  
have in m ind. W h at is throw n out or re tracted  by the au thor, in each case, 
is no t the  whole work itself b u t wrong and p rurien t readings of it suggested 
in the  rhetoric of irony. In “T he N un’s P rie st’s Tale,” for exam ple, one is to 
w ithdraw  from  adm iring a talk ing cock as an epic hero, etc. Similarly in the 
reading of all C haucer’s oeuvre, we are to  re trac t, as he reveals his in ten t 
in the  fam ous C anterbury  “R etraction ,” from constitu tion  of narrative in 
w orldly vanity. T his m eans no t th a t Chaucer closes his m ind to  any further 
refinem ent of in ten t, b u t th a t right from  the s ta rt his m ind was bent on his 
work in the  righ t direction.
C haucer’s in ten t, accordingly, has been all along to  teach good doctrine 
in the fallen m ix of (i) ignorance and knowledge and (ii) good and bad ways 
of reading a tex t. His good in ten t excuses him  for the ignorant errors of 
“unkonnynge,” while such errors enlighten our doctrine when the tru th  is 
revealed in C hrist, and C haucer would have it so. T he difficulty comes w ith 
the good and bad ways of reading a text: C haucer cannot prevent wicked
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readings o f  his texts and m ay in the subtlety o f his rhetorical “retracciouns” 
have m ade it too  easy for readers to fall. In the light o f both the reader’s 
and writer’s obligations, Chaucer feels responsibility and guilt for trials 
he m ay have put the reader through in his translations and narrations o f  
“w orldly vanitees.” He worries that he m ay be responsible for a reader’s 
sin, not that he espoused false doctrine in his secular works, for he has 
alw ays intended the “R etraction” o f such doctrine in his heuristic irony. 
In his a ttem pt to  draw out the reader’s education existentially  by allowing  
for independent assim ilation o f  the right judgm ent required to con stitute a 
narrative, Chaucer m ay have given  som e readers too much freedom.
W ith reference to  his com m ent on doctrine and his own intent that “al 
that is writen is writen for oure doctrine,” Chaucer refers to  “m y g iltes” 
(1084). T his phrase m ust not be understood here only in its m odern sense 
o f “having w ilfully com m itted  crim e” but also in its obsolete sense o f be­
ing involuntarily at fault, the mere “responsibility for an action or event” 
( OE D ) .  As the author in the com m unity that reads his work, Chaucer is 
im plicated.
Wherfore I biseke yow mekely, for the mercy of God, that ye preye for me 
that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes. (1084)
T hese are still Chaucer’s gu ilts, however —  as he says “my  g iltes.” B ut they  
are involuntary guilts, the defaute o f his participation in the involuntary  
sin o f wicked readers, who have constituted narratives o f  worldly vanities 
w ithout retracting from  such vanities. T he “giltes,” moreover, are not the 
“translacions and enditynges” but the “giltes” of  those “translacions and 
enditynges” :
and namely of my translacions and enditynges of worldly vanitees, the whiche 
I revoke in my retracciouns: /  as is the book of Troilus; the book also of Fame; 
the book of the xxv. Ladies. . . . (1085-86)
Chaucer continues w ith the list o f  his secular books, a list o f  “translacions 
and end itynges,” to  which “book” is in apposition. The list is a list o f his 
books that are translations and stories about worldly vanities aw opposed  
to his other books about scientific and religious m atters, the which have 
no irony o f  “retraccioun” in them . Books m ay be “translacions and endi­
tynges” but hardly “vanitees” them selves. T he antecedent o f  “whiche” in 
Chaucer s sentence is worldly vanitees” ; what is revoked are these vanities 
and not the stories and translations o f  them . A ny am biguous reference to 
the “translacions and enditynges” as the antecedent o f “whiche” should be 
coherent w ith its prim ary reference to  “vanitees.” The modern m eaning of
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“revoke” “to  annul, repeal” applies, however, m ore readily to  books than  
vanities; so the p rim ary  reference of “whiche” to  “vanitees” is overlooked 
in favour of w hat would have been only a recessive am biguity or C haucer’s 
escape clause in case of fanatical censors — th a t he is taking it all back 
w ith  “whiche” referring only to  “translacions and enditynges” B ut even in 
its  m odern sense “revoke” m ay apply to “worldly vanitees” as they are con­
stitu ted  w ith the reader’s approval and any com m itm ent to  them . Only 
insofar as the  narratives or “enditynges” of worldly vanity  seem like com­
m itm en t to  th a t vanity  is the telling, as the antecedent of “whiche,” itself 
“revoked” in the sense of “annulled.” B ut C haucer has ju s t declared th a t 
his doctrinal in ten t prevents any such com m itm ent, hence if revoke m eans 
annul, the  “whiche” can only refer to  C haucer’s own “enditynges” when 
they are taken in a  way C haucer never intended.
T he dom inant, and now obsolete, m eaning of “revoke” in the fourteenth  
century  was, however, “to  recall to  a  right way of life and belief, to  draw 
back from  some belief or practise” ( OED ). W orldly vanity  as com m itm ent 
to  vanity  is annulled, and (m etonym ically) those so com m itted  are “revoked 
from ” their com m itm ent. T his m etonym ic m eaning blends in to  construc­
tion  o f the  idiom  w ithou t the “from .” “People are revoked from  som ething” 
becomes “som ething revoked” (w ith “from ” understood), as in The Faerie 
Queene: she “strove their s tubborn  rages to  revoke” (ll.ii.28) (cited OED ) 
and o ther instances cited in the Middle English Dictionary as m eaning “(g) 
to  repress (vice); avert (trouble); dismiss” . . . “E sta te  of worthynesse in 
gouernance is given to  the wise to  revoken and represse the vice th a t  wolde 
encresen and  aryse,” etc. In C haucer’s syntax, the  article in “the whiche” 
em phasizes th is construction: “the which worldly vanities I revoke (and from  
which [by m etonym y] I revoke m y readers) in m y retracciouns of rhetorical 
irony throughout m y secular works.” One pulls back and is called back 
in the  rhetoric from  an ironically presented vanity or prurience, as “yonge, 
fresshe folkes” in the conclusion to  Troilus and Criseyde  are to  repair home 
from  w orldly vanity: “R epeyreth hom  fro worldly vanyte” (v.1837). The 
m etaphor is to  repair, re trac t, back off from . B ut th is does not m ean th a t 
they were no t supposed to  read the Troilus, th a t it itself should be “re­
trac ted .” A nd C haucer’s direction of the book to  “m oral Gower” (v.1856) 
is presum ed to  have been m eant all through the story  o f Troilus and Criseyde 
from  the  beginning. Likewise, in  all C haucer’s “translacions and enditynges 
of worldly vanitees,” the reader w ith a  good “enten te” “repeyreth” home 
from  w orldly “vanitees,” the which are revoked away from  the  reader and
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from  which the reader is also revoked in reading the books. T he reader is 
not supposed not to  read them .
T his faded m eaning of “revoke” would have been intended to  go w ith 
a m eaning of “retracciouns” th a t coincidentally has also faded. “R etrac- 
cioun” and its cognates “re trea t,” “re trac t,” “re trac tion ,” “re trac ta tio n ,” 
etc., all derive from  correspondence with the act o f dragging som ething 
back over again, from  A back to  B. B ut correspondence m ay be focussed 
a t various points: absence a t A (our m odern em phasis), presence again at 
B, the  act of going over the intervening terrain  again, etc. T hus Latin 
retractare m ay be used in idiom s such as undertake arm s again, to  re­
open old wounds, to  reconsider, or to  draw back, refuse; and retrahere m ay 
be used variously to  drag som ething back, to  take yourself back, or, w ith 
em phasis on where you are going back to, to  draw  on again. As George 
Salm on says of A ugustine’s use of the word (to  which C haucer would have 
been alluding): “ ‘R e trac ta tio n s’ does not m ean re trac tations in our m odern 
sense of the  word, bu t a re-handling of things previously trea ted  o f ’ ( O E D , 
q.v. l .a . 1888).3 O ur m odern m eaning of the word is “w ithdraw al of a  s ta te ­
m ent w ith adm ission of error.” B ut in the case of narrative, as in C haucer’s 
books, it  is no t clear how th is m odern sense applies, how narra tive  can be in 
error or how the error is to  be w ithdraw n. C ertainly, one has no narrative 
w ithout ethics (Haines, “No Ethics, No T ext” 35): one does not even know 
w hat is going on w ithout a judicious sense of virtue involved in the action, 
although one’s judgem ent m ay be in error.
B ut does retraction  o f such error m ean retraction  of the  narra tive  it­
self or pretense th a t you never read it and never will again? Unlikely. T h a t 
would be like saying redem ption of history is its annihilation . The absurd ity  
of re trac ting  a narra tive  and  the personal im possibility for Chaucer of ban­
ning or annulling his books already in circulation should force “retracciouns” 
away from  the m odern m eaning of retraction back to  its older m eaning th a t 
Chaucer em phasizes by alluding to  A ugustine’s plural “R etrac ta tiones” : “to  
trea t of again .” To take th is as the m eaning of “retracciouns” still leaves 
the am biguity: did C haucer him self change his m ind or has he m ean t the 
“retracciouns” all along? If he changed his m ind like A ugustine and wished 
to  tre a t again of m ateria l previously dealt w ith, then  where does he do it? 
He has no t published a book like A ugustine’s “R etrac ta tions.” Nor does he 
need to . In his rhetoric all along are hints, which we recognize as C haucer’s 
irony, th a t the narra tive  m ust be gone over again in the re tractions of any 
approval or enjoym ent of vice. Each m orally deficient constitu tion  of n ar­
rative is to  be pulled back from  in “retracciouns” th a t C haucer m eant all
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along. He does not use the singular bu t the plural “retracciouns,” which 
could hardly be th a t single retraction  erroneously a ttrib u ted  to  Chaucer 
as an adm ission he was all wrong. C haucer’s in ten t all along has been to  
educate the  reader in “retracciouns” from the worldly vanity of narrative 
viciously constitu ted . T he reader has been subject to  ethical tests to  trea t 
the narra tive  right —  or to  re-treat. And failure in such ethical tests is not 
ju s t  play in some gam e of fiction, bu t actual, uncom fortable guilt. Perhaps 
th a t  is another reason we w ant to  blam e it all on Chaucer and m isread his 
“R etrac tion .” Readers, nevertheless, cannot be excluded from  the rhetoric 
of C haucer’s “retracciouns,” not if there is to  be any coherence w ith  the 
sta ted  in ten t: “al th a t  is w riten is w riten for oure doctrine.”
T hroughou t his oeuvre, Chaucer, in fact, frequently addresses his con­
cern for all the  com plexities of “entente,” including the reader’s m oral 
“en ten te” and  responsibility. B ut because he often addresses th a t concern 
playfully, ethics can easily get lost in the  aesthetics. “U nkonnynge” m ay be 
lim ited to  its m eaning as poetical skill, and Chaucer is understood to  be 
saying no m ore th a n  “enjoy m y poetry  and give it good reviews.” T hus, 
in The House of Fame, “m ysdem e” (97) has been restricted  to  the poor 
judg m en t of those no t up to  scratch  in poetry appreciation , even though 
th is does no t account very well for how they “hy t m ysdem en in her tho g h t” 
(92): reviewers do no t judge or m isjudge som ething in the ir own though t — 
they sim ply judge or m isjudge it. Nor is this a  likely account of C haucer’s 
prayer th a t  the  “mover of . . . al” give joy  of their dream s to  all who hear 
C haucer’s d ream  to ld  arigh t and who do not “m ysdem e” it. T he  in te rp re ta ­
tion  and  judgm en t o f dream s like the  judgm ent of the  world is a  m oral act. 
B ut to  m ake his po in t C haucer exaggerates, m aking fun of his own (lack of) 
charity. He asks G od to  give joy  in their own dream s to  those who hear his 
dream  to ld  w ith righ t judgem ent, and, he continues,
send hem al th a t may hem plese,
T h a t take hit wel and skorne hyt noght,
Ne hy t mysdemen in her thoght 
Thorgh malicious entencion.
And whoso thorgh presumpcion,
O r hate, or skorn, or thorgh envye,
Dispit, or jape, or vilanye,
Mysdeme hyt, pray I Jesus God
T h a t (drem e he barefot, dreme he shod),
T h a t every harm  th a t any man 
H ath had, syth the world began,
Befalle hym therof, or he sterve,
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And graunte he mote hit ful deserve,
Lo, with such a conclusion 
As had of his avision 
Cresus, th a t was kyng of Lyde,
T h a t high upon a gebet dyde!
This prayer shal he have of me;
I am no bet in charyte!
Now herkeneth, as I have yow seyd,
W hat th a t I m ette, or I abreyd. (90-110)
C haucer prays for such extravagant m isfortune to  befall those who will not 
read his work w ith right judgm ent th a t his own pretended lack of charity  
is facetiously undercut. His facetious prayer prevents Chaucer from being 
the m alevolent prosecutor, not him self subject to  the  rule of charity; but 
the joke depends on the serious ethics of “m alicious entencion” — the envy, 
presum ption, hate , scorn, spite, jest, vulgarity, and so forth , which prevent 
righ t judg m en t or in terp retation  of w hat is read or heard. Chaucer does 
no t seem to  consider here in The House of Fame any responsibility he m ay 
have him self for the  results of a  reader’s “m alicious entencion” ; the em pha­
sis, instead, is on the reader’s responsibility to  m eet the m oral subtlety  of 
C haucer’s rhetoric in the in terpretation  of a  dream  told w ith C haucer’s own 
good in ten t ‘ a rygh t.” B ut w ithout this presum ption of the reader’s respon­
sibility, C haucer’s own responsibility as he presents it in the  C anterbury  
“R etrac tion” cannot be comprehended. As May in the  “M erchant’s Tale” 
says, despite its  facetious context, “He th a t m ysconceyveth, he m ysdem eth” 
(iv.2410): a  literal s ta te  of affairs m ust be conceived properly or else it is 
m isjudged: “Hony soyt qui mal pense.”
In  the prologue to  Troilus and Criseyde, Chaucer again calls on his 
audience to  listen w ith a  “good entencioun” to  m atch  the in ten t of his own 
charity  and compassion in determ ining w hat happened:
For so hope I my sowle best avaunce,
To prey for hem th a t Loves servauntz be,
And write hire wo, and lyve in charité,
And for to  have of hem compassioun,
As though I were hire owne brother dere.
Now herkneth with a good entencioun,
For now wil I gon streght to  my matere. (1.47-53)
Those who see the  characters as unw orthy o f com passion and so less than  
hum an do not know w hat is going on. Sex-objects o f pornography in a 
pru rien t reading of the bedroom  scenes; sinful villains beyond redem ption; 
and other less th an  hum an characters are not p a rt of the narrative hearkened
to  w ith a “good entencioun” —  such as th a t in tention would be judged 
in either the m ediaeval or m odern era. Chaucer does not here consider 
the  possible failure of the reader’s intention  or the im plication of his own 
responsibility in such a failure; perhaps a t th is stage of his career he was 
m ore op tim istic  abou t w hat he could expect from his readers and the good 
doctrine in which his tex ts would participate. B ut his concern th a t the 
reader “herkneth w ith a good entencioun” does entail the possibility of a 
bad “entencioun.” T his anxiety of w riting reflects the  anxiety of m ediaeval 
reading: how could the fifteenth-century compiler of the treatise  Disce more, 
in structing  women religious in the distinction between amicitia and am or , 
have though t th a t Troilus and Criseyde was appropriate  reading? As Lee 
P a tte rso n  argues in a  s tudy  of th is treatise, the diagnosis of m oral theology 
m ay also be offered in the gradual revelations of n arra tive  rom ance: “the 
conclusion m akes explicit an entente th a t was a t the beginning only a  la ten t 
possibility” (145). T he au thor of the  treatise teaches his readers to  locate 
the  Troilus in a context th a t allows its reading to  be a t once safe and loving: 
“he seeks no t to  disarm  the  tex t b u t to  arm  the reader” (153). However 
seductive its  sweet le tte r or heretical its alien spirit, as Boccaccio argued in 
the  trad itio n  of A ugustin ian  herm eneutics, a  tex t can be read w ith im punity  
by a  reader endowed w ith “a  pure and steadfast m ind” (84).
In The Canterbury Tales them selves, C haucer often plays w ith the  im ­
plications of the  reader’s “en ten te .” In “T he Tale of Sir T hopas,” which 
Chaucer him self is supposed to  tell as one of the characters on the  pilgrim ­
age, th e  n a rra to r “him self” addresses his audience “Listeth, lordes, in good 
en ten t” (iv.712), and then  proceeds to  abuse their patience w ith doggerel 
rom ance. In th is rhetoric, a  dupe is im plied who does n o t get the twofold 
lite rary  and social satire: the dupe m ay be the n a rra to r “h im se lf’ or one 
the  n a rra to r  ju s t  pretends to  be. Such a  dupe, pretended as the voice of 
the au tho r, counterpoints the reader’s “enten te ,” bo th  aesthetic and ethical: 
how can the reader have good “entente” if the w riter (as the  dupe) does 
no t?  A nd once th is question is posed in the rhetoric of “Sir T hopas,” the 
dialectic of the next question becomes obvious: how can the w riter have 
good “enten te” if the  reader does not? T he reader and w riter m ay have 
good in ten ts independent of each o ther b u t not in the jo in t constitu tion  of 
a good story. A good sto ry  m ust be the product of tw o good “ententes” ; if 
either one fails to  be good, the story  fails. H arry Bailly cuts C haucer off 
because he is weary of the “lewednesse” and his ears “aken” of the “d rasty” 
speech: he cannot see the  im plied au thor in the rhetoric who is not a dupe: 
m etaphysically, he cannot see C haucer the au thor and intellectually, he
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does not consider th a t the “n a rra to r” m ight be talk ing parody on purpose. 
H arry him self then becomes a dupe failing to  have a good “enten te” — 
even though if he did consider the possibility of in tentional parody it  is not 
likely he would appreciate it anyway, not being a  reader of high rom ance. 
Chaucer the n a rra to r (or recorder) then goes on to  tell his tale of Melibee 
in prose asking for the courtesy no t to  be in terrupted: “herkneth w hat 
th a t I shal seye /  A nd la t me tellen al m y tale, I preye” (v ii.965-66). He 
has ju s t said the sam e thing ra th e r gauchely as narra to r of “Sir T hopas” : 
“Now holde youre m outh , par charitee /  Bothe knyght and lady free, /  And 
herkneth  to  m y spelle” (vn.891-93). Shut up and listen: the  im perative 
to  com m unicate as well as to  construe requires ethics in bo th  the reader’s 
and w riter’s “en ten te .” A lthough “T he Tale of Melibee” m ay not be told 
w ith the sam e words as the original and be longer “som w hat m oore /  O f 
proverbes, its construal is to  be the sam e as the original in C haucer’s own 
sentence : Shul ye nowher fynden difference” — nowhere being a  good 
place to  look for such “differance.” C haucer continues his fairly long tale 
of Melibee un in terrup ted  and then  rings the changes on the sam e term s we 
find in his “R etraction” : “unkonnynge,” “giltes,” “mercy.” C haucer’s w it 
th rough all these com plications of in ten t depends on the assum ption th a t 
it is the reader’s as well as the w riter’s ethical obligation to  have a  “good 
en ten te .”
This serious complexion of narrative casts a new light on C haucer’s 
request in the M iller’s prologue not to  “m aken ernest of gam e” (1.3186). 
One gam e th a t we are not to  m ake “ernest” of is C haucer’s gam e th a t  he 
could no t be to  blam e because it was the Miller who to ld  the story, not 
Chaucer. T h a t is only a  joke, a  gam e, th a t we are no t to  take earnestly, not 
after C haucer has ju s t asked us “For Goddes love, dem eth not th a t I seye /  
O f yvel entente (1.3172—73): w hat would be the  point of asking us no t to  
th ink th a t he speaks w ith an evil “entente” if it were impossible for him  to 
do so? We are to  p u t him  “out o f blam e” no t because it is all a  gam e, in 
which there can be no m oral blam e or praise, b u t because, in fact, he is not 
to  blam e: he could be guilty  b u t, in fact, he is not (Haines, Fortunate Fall 
223). He m ust “reherce /  Hir tales alle, be they b e ttre  or werse” (3173-74). 
G od does no t tu rn  over the leaf and choose another tale; God reads them  
all. And so m ust the sain ts of h istory  which we are called to  be: all m ust 
be told and read w ith a  good “entente” as Chaucer desires. T he gam e 
we are no t to  take seriously is irony in the telling and not the telling itself, 
which is always finally serious and  comic, “for Goddes love” ; we m ust not 
be earnest dolts. A lthough C haucer seems to  be saying all his fiction is ju s t
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a gam e th a t  can be dismissed — a  protective fall-back position if he gets in 
too  m uch trouble for it w ith those who w ant to tu rn  over the leaf and do not
—  he is actually  saying th a t only the ironic m eanings are to  be dismissed 
and not taken  earnestly. One would see a  sim ilar trope in the charitable 
reading o f the  Wife of B a th ’s rhetoric when she says her in ten t is b u t for to  
play: she expects her audience to  be intelligent enough to  get the paradox 
th a t th a t in ten t itself m ust also be for play. Her real in ten t is to  have her 
concerns as a  wom an taken seriously by her audience. B ut for those in the 
audience who are hostile and could harm  her, she has the  fall-back position 
th a t she is ju s t  kidding: “For m yn entente is n a t b u t for to  pleye” ( i l l .192).
C haucer’s frequent elaboration of in ten t in the eth ical m om ent of read­
ing as well as w riting m ust, accordingly, be com prehended in the concerns 
of his fam ous “R etraction” a t the end of The Canterbury Tales. O ur tra ­
ditional reading of C haucer’s “R etraction” probably first goes wrong a t the 
word “giltes” : we have not been able to  see th a t “giltes” refers to  the way 
“al th a t is w riten” for our doctrine m ay not all have been read for our doc­
trine. H aving suppressed our constitu tion  of tex tual n arra tive  as an ethical 
activity , we are blind to  C haucer’s anxiety th a t the subtle tria ls and tests in 
his rhetoric m ay have been too  difficult for m any of his readers. Every m oral 
test they fail, they sin. C haucer would be anxious abou t his responsibility 
for such sinful readings of his works “of m any a  song and m any a  leccherous 
lay” (1087) and m ay be having second thoughts abou t the  rhetoric of irony. 
Som etim es the  voices of sinful characters “sownen” as if th e  whole narrative 
m ay be consonant w ith sin. And the ethical process of rhetoric suggested by 
the  idiom  “in to  sinne” indicates C haucer is concerned w ith  the  effect on the 
reader in the  constitu tion  of narrative. Like m any au thors, C haucer would 
be surprised th a t  he is read by so m any readers in the wrong way and th a t 
his culture is quite  so corrupt. For m odern au thors who m ay not adm it 
the ethical m om ent of understanding, th is wrong way cannot be considered 
im m oral, ju s t stup id . B ut in an age when the ethical m om ent was taken 
for g ran ted , an  au thor would see th a t the wrong way was, indeed, wrong. 
As the au tho r of the  Gawain postscrip t wrote, pointedly  om itting  the “Y” 
of the G arte r M otto: “HONY SOYT QUI MAL PENCE.” Thinking evilly in 
vicious in terp re ta tions is blam ew orthy (Haines, “Hony soyt” 181).
E thical criticism  of the reader’s response entails th a t the reader can sin. 
Since fact and value cannot be separated in a full and objective account of 
any s ta te  of affairs, then the sta te  of affairs in and m ediated  by C haucer’s 
tex t m ust be understood w ith right judgm ent of w hat is going on. One does 
no t know w hat is going on in the m ere physiology of vaginal penetration ,
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for exam ple, unless one also knows whether it is adultery, rape, passionate, 
p rostitu ted , beautiful, and so forth . Beauty and virtue as well as tru th  
are p a rt of an “objective” account (Zemach; M acintyre 206). In filling 
in the indeterm inacies of a narrative, moreover, the reader’s actual world 
is im plicated. T he narra to r is presum ed to have two eyes not three, for 
exam ple, even though the tex t does not say so explicitly; th is presum ption is 
m ade on the basis of the reader’s norm al, actual world. Similarly, if a  reader 
presum es in a reported  instance of revenge th a t th is is quite proper, even 
though there is no explicit approval in the text, then th a t says som ething 
abou t the reader’s own world from  which indeterm inacies of the  narra tive  
are filled in. And a reader m ust be responsible for the ju d g m en t by which 
sta tes of affairs in the world are constituted, as this judgm ent is revealed in 
the  tex tually  m ediated constitu tion of both  fiction and history.
T his account of ineluctable ethics based on the principle of m inim al 
departure  (Haines, “No Ethics, No T ext” ) makes a  stronger case for ethical 
criticism  th an  a principle of psychological identification argued by W ayne 
Booth: “all stories will produce a  practical pattern ing  of desire, so long as I 
stay  w ith th em ” (204). On the contrary, this “I” m ay be disassociated from  
W ayne Booth. Fiction involves pretense in the role of a pretended listening 
act to m atch  the role of the im plied a u th o r’s pretended speech act th a t it is 
actual history, and so on. T hrough this necessary pretense, disassociation 
from  vice and wicked desire is always possible. A sain t can read any book. 
And th is is ju s t w hat Booth shows in the la tte r chapters o f The Company 
We Keep as he portrays him self learning to  encounter Jan e  A usten, M ark 
Tw ain, D.H. Lawrence, and others in the sanctity  of m atu re , ethical reading. 
“Sharing the fixed norm s of the im plied au tho r” (145), who is to  be judged  
as the reader’s “friend” (169) and who always w ants a  n arra tive  in some 
way to  be didactic (152-53), is no t necessary for those who disagree w ith 
those norm s, even though they m ay be following the story  and im agining 
those norm s. Fictional narrative requires im agination and pretense, b u t not 
identification.
Focus on the reader’s norm s as well as the au th o r’s shows it  is im possible 
no t to  be ethical as the reader understands sta tes of affairs in the world 
and im ports th is inform ation in to  the constitution of a n arra tive  according 
to  the principle of m inim al departure. I t is not only in the  subsequent 
influence of a narrative, how a  reader m ay behave after reading it, b u t in 
its very constitu tion  itself th a t the  ethical m om ent occurs. In the act itself 
of reading, the reader is already im plicated in guilt or steadfast in v irtue. 
As T hom as A quinas argues, the  object of the intellect is bo th  m oral and
physical tru th , and any subversion of th is aim  is sinful (Summa Theologia 
2.2.xv). T hus when we suppress our partic ipation  in sta tes of affairs, the 
object of the  intellect assumes a  false pretense th rough which it is difficult 
to  recognize how any narrative could be constitu ted  or m orally objectified.
If our reading is understood to  have no m oral responsibility, it becomes 
difficult to  see w hat an au thor like Chaucer could have to  be sorry abou t, 
except perhaps for having w ritten  the tex ts them selves, now, therefore, to  
be retrac ted , because vicious reading can only be the result of a vicious 
au thor. So C haucer is variously explained as having been a t the m ercy of 
m onks who forced him  to retract; or he used a  form ulaic “R etraction” th a t 
is no t m ean t because it is formulaic or applies only to  the n arra to r w ithin 
The Canterbury Tales bu t not to  Chaucer himself; or the “R etraction” is 
ju s t a  lite rary  convention to  list C haucer’s works; or life is a  pilgrim age 
th a t  always ends in penance: mediaeval Chaucer m ay have been sorry for 
his works, b u t we do no t have to  be. Chaucer, however, has not been 
m aking a  “R etrac tion” for the works in his list any m ore th an  to  affirm 
the  rhetorical “retracciouns” th a t are already in them  in each work, the 
“R etrac tion” th rough irony from  vain and worldly in terp re ta tions consonant 
w ith sin, “th a t  sownen in to  synne.” Chaucer would no t have been ignorant 
of these o ther m eanings his “R etraction” would have as merely p a rt o f a 
generic convention (Sayce 243). His sincerity, in fact, m ay also involve a 
com plicated send up of the  retractions th a t some theologians autom atically  
published as insurance along with whatever they wrote. B ut such satire 
need no t exhaust C haucer’s in ten t, for the  sincerity, w ithou t which it could 
no t be satire , im plies the  possibility of retraction  from  such purely facetious 
retraction .
T he sincerity  of C haucer’s in ten t implies th a t  his guilts of  transla tion  
and  “enditynges” in his reader’s behaviour are those for which Chaucer is 
involuntarily  a t  fault. Even where readers are subject to  a  fair m oral test 
in the  rhetoric and  fail, dam age is done to  the  m oral fabric of society. And 
when C haucer’s tex t becomes an occasion of sin, the  m oral test for subse­
quent readers will become less and less fair as weak readers are influenced 
by the  increasingly guilty  trad itio n  of their culture. C haucer then  becomes 
guilty  of having set an unfair test. W eak readers who are not free not 
to  resist tem p ta tio n  in C haucer’s rhetoric and for whom  it is no t really a 
tem p ta tio n  are, nevertheless, subject to  a  justified reproach and guilty  of 
involuntary  sin (so long as the  ethical s tandard  of the society does not itself 
change).
144 FLORILEGIUM 10, 1988-91
VICTOR YELVERTON HAINES 145
Aside from the theology of original sin, the possibility of involuntary sin 
is dem onstrated by Robert Merrihew Adams in such sins as self-righteousness, 
racism, and the unjust anger condemned by Jesus (M atthew 5:21-22). Weak 
readers may be liable to reproach for such involuntary sins committed in 
constituting the narrative — taking, for example, Chaucer’s comment on 
the Wife of B ath’s early sex life “withouten oother compaignye in youthe” 
(1.461) to refer unambiguously to extra lovers; it does not occur to such 
thoughtless accusation or prurient sexism that women may be chastely m ar­
ried several times without having other company in youth as some might 
expect, ju st as a woman may go out alone “withouten oother compaignye” 
(Kennedy). Such involuntary, thoughtless reading is subject to reproach: 
the potential was there for a thoughtful and ju st reading. Chaucer is not 
subject to such reproach if his intent is good and doctrine sound, and for 
doctrinal error due to “unkonnynge” he has already asked mercy. Here one 
m ight distinguish involuntary sin from involuntary guilt. Sin requires one’s 
own behaviour, either voluntary or involuntary; guilt may be incurred by 
the sinful behaviour of others in one’s community. It is this guilt which 
Chaucer suffers. Sin can never be attributed to God; guilt might, if our 
creation in G od’s image or the incarnation brings God within the human 
community. In this distinction between involuntary sin and involuntary 
guilt, the sense of involuntary must be elaborated to exclude the idea of 
voluntary guilt. No one wants guilt or sin except in a Manichaean system. 
Involuntary is supposed to describe the action or preliminary state of being, 
not the sinfulness or guilt itself.
Chaucer’s concern for guilty readers would be enough to  explain his use 
of the word “giltes” in its now more or less obsolete sense of mere “respon­
sibility for an action or event; the [involuntary] ‘fault’ of (some person)”
( O E D ), as when one is guilty of manslaughter. Chaucer is guilty, through 
the voluntary and involuntary sins of his readers, of an involuntary sin him­
self by further polluting the moral ecology of his culture. And further, as 
a member of th a t culture, he in turn is involuntarily influenced by its pol­
lution and could conceivably come with so many of his readers to  approve 
of the worldly vanity he had intended to revoke through irony. Who can 
presume to resist the oceanic pressure of culture? “No island is an island.”
It is not likely Chaucer would forget his own irony, but the spectacle of so 
many of his readers who did not get it could remind an enlightened poet 
of how he himself must also be unenlightened in some ways he does not 
know of, both individually and culturally. If one can see tha t other people 
and cultures are sinful in ways they do not know, so probably is one’s own,
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which one cannot see, while just having one’s being embedded in it incurs 
guilt in a sinful existence, however involuntary. Only in the symbolic desert 
is a perspective offered outside society from the transcendental sublime to 
what cannot be known within th a t culture. In the general guilt of human 
society, Chaucer recognizes the transmission through himself of involuntary 
guilt originating somewhere in the original sin and guilt of the Fall.
But the nature of collective guilt is more complex than involuntary fault. 
In a century when theologians were asking such questions in their Sentences 
as “whether God could do evil if he wished” (Courtenay 245), one would 
expect a great poet to in tu it the complexities of guilt as they touch on an 
author and creator as tester. Chaucer’s genius would come to ponder his 
own role as author and creator in ethical tests set for readers many of whom 
fail and are thus guilty, involving Chaucer in collective guilt as a member 
of th a t community sick with guilt. If Chaucer were not a part of his society 
and culture and could act independently of it and all its failings, he could 
test others with impunity (if he could find a language to do it in) — just 
as God could test us without any personal risk of suffering if we were not 
made in G od’s image. The final punishment of the compassionate author 
who permits original sin is th a t the innocent must suffer. And yet such an 
author is not innocent of the knowledge that the voluntary act of setting an 
ethical test may implicate the innocent in collective, involuntary sin, and 
in its suffering and punishment. Chaucer alone, however, could never bear 
such guilt. Only in some collective way as in the collective body of Christ, 
who through sacrifice dies to the society of sin, can such collective guilt 
be borne; there it can be borne freely in the Way of the Cross, without 
resentment th a t the punishment is too great for an individual’s particular 
sin, since self-sacrifice is not payment for a personal debt. The collective sin 
Chaucer shares in a guilty society of readers is the sin which, after listing 
his works with “retracciouns” in them, he asks tha t we pray Christ “for 
his grete mercy foryeve me the synne” (1087). Chaucer knows tha t as a 
tester he risks his readers’ voluntary and involuntary sins, especially in his 
own fourteenth-century society. But he runs this risk voluntarily, like God 
taking on the sins of the world for our sakes. No wonder Chaucer desires 
help from God th a t for his great mercy he forgive him “the synne.”
Chaucer thus does not withdraw through his irony from the human 
condition of sin: he engages it even more forcefully by presenting it for 
the participation of the reader’s judgm ent. And for those readers who err, 
guilty readings of narrative and history cannot be denied by trying to an­
nul the historical fact of such readings. Instead, in the “retraccioun” of
différance, one pulls back from the worldly constitution of vanity. It is with 
this obscurity of retraccioun” and in his unknowing of the reader’s consti­
tution of the narrative tha t Chaucer portrays the occultation of vanity. He 
follows the poet’s duty, as Barbara Johnson says, “to stand as a guardian 
of an ignorance that does not know itself, an ignorance tha t would other­
wise be lost” (30). W hat the reader does not know is imported into the 
constitution of narrative through the principle of minimal departure (Lewis 
45) ju st as much as what the reader does know: unexamined assumptions 
and attitudes and virtues and vice are all part of the reader’s actual world 
with which indeterminacies of the narrative are filled in. In the constitution 
of narrative, it is what we do not know  we do not know th a t weaves the 
tightest web of error. Continual anamnesis in the ethical constitution of a 
textual narrative, surprises us with an ironic otherness from which we can 
only retract in the moment of suddenly discovering we are ignorant of it 
(Johnson 16).
But for those of us whose ethical ignorance in the act of constituting 
a narrative is not surprise but merely suppressive “power” (Sedgwick 103), 
it is hard to see what Chaucer is talking about in the “Retraction” if he is 
not trying to annul works and suppress doctrine tha t he has now changed 
his mind about. Such a view has always, however, entailed some confusion. 
Why would Chaucer ask for forgiveness of his “giltes” namely for “transla­
to n s  and enditynges” just after saying “ ‘Al that is writen is writen for 
oure doctrine,’ and that is myn entente”? Wherein is the guilt for writ­
ing translations and stories intended for our teaching and doctrine? The 
confusion clears up with the insight that the object of Chaucer’s guilt is 
not Chaucer’s writing, but his readers’ reading. T hat is his anxiety “that 
Christ for his grete mercy foryeve me the synne.” The collective sin of his 
readers is Chaucer’s burden. It is not the “translacions and enditynges” 
themselves tha t are the object of retraction but the “worldly vanitees” in 
them  — which are present there only ironically. Good readers may continue 
to read his work exercised in the various “retracciouns” of irony, difficult as 
th a t may be except in his sain ts’ legends and homilies, where there is no 
irony. Chaucer, in the virtue of his complete oeuvre, never intended to be 
of this “worldly vanitee,” and in the Boethian supplication a t the end of 
the “Parson’s Tale,” he expresses his intent that good readers be with him. 
Yet if doctrine is to be taught in freedom, it must be tested existentially, 
and if, as is the case with moral doctrine, to fail the test is to sin, what 
has the author of freedom done! Good teachers of the fallen race of Adam 
must suffer for the guilt of those who fall. Chaucer’s anguish in the abyss of
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authorial instruction leaves nothing from which he may retract and nothing 
left to retract.
Such sophisticated anguish of the author is a far cry from the simple- 
minded “Retraction” we have attributed to Chaucer in the twentieth century
— as if the genius of the Chaucerian oeuvre did not understand the reader is 
implicated morally in the constitution of textual narrative, as if the narrative 
is out there, an “object” for which the author alone is morally responsible. 
For those who take this view of the text, there can only be the meaning of 
his “Retraction” we have traditionally understood —- with “giltes” referring 
only to the writing about “worldly vanitees.” As the diplomatic court poet, 
Chaucer can use this meaning to protect himself against those who may want 
his life for writing blasphemous stories. But as the sophisticated creator he 
is, Chaucer knows th a t a saint can read any book, tha t God sees into the 
depths of Hell, and th a t in the eyes of God he is himself guiltless where his 
intention is concerned. It is for those of us who are less than saints that 
Chaucer is concerned: our moral failures in reading are his anguish. Has 
he not tem pted us too sorely? For all our vicious, uncharitable readings, 
perhaps we owe him a series of retractions — especially for our reading his 
“retracciouns” as a single “Retraction.”
Dawson College, Montreal
NOTES
1 T h e  te x t u sed  is The R iverside  Chaucer, ed. L arry  D. B enson, 3 rd  ed . (B oston: 
H ough ton  Mifflin, 1987). F o r a n  analysis of th e  theology of T hom as G ascoigne’s read ing  
o f th e  su p p lica tio n  to  th e  re ad e r as a  la te  rep en tan ce  an d  for a  tho rough  review  of 
scho larsh ip  on  it  as th e  “R e trac tio n ” in  general, see D ouglas W urtele, “T he P en itence  of 
G eoffrey C h au cer,” V iator  11 (1980), 335—359.
2 In ten tio n  declared  by  C haucer for b o th  him self a n d  his in ten d ed  re ad e r c an n o t be 
re s tr ic te d  to  an y  technical m ean ing  of in ten t th a t  w ould exclude desire a n d  responsibility , 
fo r th e re  is no  such  m ediaeval m eaning . In  his d isse rta tio n  in  progress a t  M cGill Uni­
versity , R o b e rt M yles surveys m ediaeval trad itio n s  of “in ten tiona lity” : none excludes th e  
p e rso n a l agency  o f desire. E ven “first in ten tio n ,” as th e  m in d ’s conception s tre tch ed  in to  
( in  tendere) a n  o b jec t, involves p a rtic ip a tio n  o f th e  will, for it is still a  form  of in ten tio n  
like  th e  “second  in ten tio n ,” w hich clearly  involves h u m an  choice as th e  m in d ’s concep­
tio n  s tre tc h e d  in to  i ts  own conception  of th e  o b jec t in  term s of genus, species, difference, 
id en tity , e tc . As m o d em  “n a tu ra lis t” philosophers argue, e th ics a n d  aes th e tic s  can n o t be 
excluded  from  th e  id en tity  of o b jec ts  (an d  tex ts) as we conceive th em  stre tch in g  o u t our 
m in d s in to  th e ir  co n stitu tio n . Hence C h au cer’s d em and  th a t  th e  read e r h earken  w ith  a  
go o d  in te n t, re p ea te d  in  Troilus and Criseyde, The House of Fame, an d  elsew here (see 
below ), is a n  e th ical d em an d  of th e  re ad e r’s response, failure in  w hich b rings gu ilt.
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3 T h e  M iddle English D ictionary  gives tw o exam ples o f the  w ord used for physical
re tra c tio n  a n d  only th e  single one from  C haucer for m en ta l re trac tio n . T h e  ed ito rs, beg­
ging th e  q u estion  ra ised  by  C h aucer’s tex t, tran s la te  i t  only as rep u d ia tio n  o r recan ta tio n .
I w ould like to  th a n k  R o b ert M yles, D ouglas W urtele, Beverly K ennedy, a n d  D avid
W illiam s for help  in  o u r discussions on  th e  A pril p ilgrim age to  an d  from  P ly m o u th , NH.
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